it is impossible we can be moved by them as a sign of the other." This
will explain why we are pleased with the exact imitation of the
dewdrop on the peach, and why we are disgusted with the Magdalen's
tears by Vanderwerf; and we further draw this inevitable conclusion,
of very important consequence to artists, who have very erroneous
notions upon the subject, that this sort of imitation, which, by the
deception of its name, should be most like, is actually less like
nature, because it takes from nature its impression by substituting a
sense of the jugglery. This chapter on ideas of imitation is good and
useful. We think, in the after part of his work, wherein is much
criticism on pictures by the old masters and by moderns, our author
must have lost the remembrance of what he has so well said on his
ideas of imitation; and in the following chapter on "Ideas of Truth."
"The word truth, as applied to art, signifies the faithful statement,
either to the mind or senses, of any fact of nature." The reader will
readily see how "ideas of truth" differ from "ideas of imitation." The
latter relating only to material objects, the former taking in the
conceptions of the mind--may be conveyed by signs or symbols,
"themselves no image nor likeness of any thing." "An idea of truth
exists in the statement of _one_ attribute of any thing; but an idea
of imitation only in the resemblance of as many attributes as we are
usually cognizant of in its real presence." Hence it follows that
ideas of truth are inconsistent with ideas of imitation; for, as we
before said, ideas of imitation remove the impression by an
ever-present sense of the deception or falsehood. This is put very
conclusively--"so that the moment ideas of truth are grouped together,
so as to give rise to an idea of imitation, they change their very
nature--lose their essence as ideas of truth--and are corrupted and
degraded, so as to share in the treachery of what they have produced.
Hence, finally, ideas of truth are the foundation, and ideas of
imitation the distinction, of all art. We shall be better able to
appreciate their relative dignity after the investigation which we
propose of functions of the former; but we may as well now express the
conclusion to which we shall then be led--that no picture can be good
which deceives by its imitation; for the very reason that nothing can
be beautiful which is not true." This is perhaps rather too
indiscriminate. It has been shown