the
general proposition was collected by induction_. * * *

"In the above observations, it has, I think, been
clearly shown, that although there is always a process
of reasoning or inference where a syllogism is used, the
syllogism is not a correct analysis of that process of
reasoning or inference; which is, on the contrary, (when
not a mere inference from testimony,) an inference from
particulars to particulars; authorized by a previous
inference from particulars to generals, and
substantially the same with it: of the nature,
therefore, of Induction. But while these conclusions
appear to me undeniable, I must yet enter a protest, as
strong as that of Archbishop Whately himself, against
the doctrine that the syllogistic art is useless for the
purposes of reasoning. The reasoning lies in the act of
generalisation, not in interpreting the record of that
act; but the syllogistic form is all indispensable
collateral security for the correctness of the
generalisation itself."--P. 259.

By this explanation we are released from the dilemma into which the
syllogistic and non-syllogistic party had together thrown us. We can
acknowledge that the process of reason can be always exhibited in the
form of a syllogism, and yet not be driven to the strange and
perplexing conclusion that our reasoning can never conduct us to a new
truth, never lead us further than to admit in one shape what we had
already admitted in another. We have, or may have, it is true, a
_major_ in all our ratiocination, implied, if not expressed, and are
so far syllogistic; but then the real premiss from which we reason is
the amount of experience on which that major was founded, to which
amount of experience we, in fact, made an addition in our _minor_, or
conclusion.

But while we accept this explanation, and are grateful for the
deliverance it works for us, we must also admit, (and we are not aware
that Mr Mill would controvert this admission,) that there is a large
class of cases in which our reasoning betrays no reference to this
anterior experience, and where the usual explanation given by teachers
of logic is perfectly applicable; cases where our object is, not the
discovery of truth for ourselves, but to convince another of his
error, by showing him that the proposition, which in his blindness or
prejudice he has chosen to contradict, is part and parcel of some
other pro