aniel Webster of having borrowed his
theory of the inseparable Union from John C. Calhoun, or ex-President
Cleveland of having borrowed his message on tariff reform from the
Home Market Club, as to accuse me of having borrowed my theory of
universals from Hegel. Hegel's theory of universals is divided from
mine by the whole vast chasm between realism and idealism. The two
theories contradict each other absolutely, uncompromisingly,
irreconcilably: Hegel's is a theory of "absolute idealism" or "pure
thought" (_reines Denken_), that is, of _thought absolutely
independent of experience_, while mine is a theory of "scientific
realism," that is, of _thought absolutely dependent upon experience._
It is quite immaterial here which theory is the true one; the only
point involved at present is that the two theories flatly contradict
each other, and that it is self-evidently impossible that either
_could_ be "borrowed," consciously or unconsciously, from the other.
If Dr. Royce had ever done any hard thinking on the theory of
universals, or if he had the slightest comprehension of the problems
it involves, he would never have been so rash as to charge me with
"borrowing" my theory from Hegel, and thus to commit himself
irrevocably to a defence of the absurd; but eagerness to accuse
another has betrayed him into a position whence it is impossible for
him to escape with honor. Solely by misdescribing my philosophy as
"essentially idealistic" when it openly and constantly and
emphatically avows itself to be essentially realistic, could Dr. Royce
give the faintest color of plausibility to his monstrous and
supremely ridiculous accusation of plagiarism; solely by presuming
upon the public ignorance both of Hegel and of my own work could he
dare to publish such an accusation to the world. These gross
misrepresentations, however, he did not hesitate to make, since they
were necessary in order to pave the way to a third and still grosser
misrepresentation on which he apparently had set his heart: namely,
that, after borrowing the whole substance of my philosophy from Hegel,
I have been guilty of making "vast and extravagant pretensions" as to
my own "novelty," "originality," and "profundity," not only with
regard to my published books, but also with regard to my "still
unpublished system of philosophy." His words are these:--
"Of novelty, good or bad, the book contains, indeed, despite its vast
pretensions, hardly a sign."
"It is du
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