the gunners near Ain Yebrud and make the track passable for the
artillery as far as Selwad on the far side of Tel Asur. The track was
a dry river bed between two very thick walls most of the way, and
where it was impassable a track had to be made across country, which
meant cutting down trees and levelling terraces. Though there was
about five miles of road to prepare, so well did they work at it that
they were actually working on the road in front of the supports before
Tel Asur was finally captured, and the guns were able to move forward
that night.

Meanwhile the other three companies had gone up the Nablus road to
repair it, as it had not only been heavily shelled by our artillery
but also blown up in a great many places by the retreating Turks. The
enemy were offering a stout resistance to our advance, and held a
strong line across the road. Tel Asur was captured and lost three
times before it finally remained in our hands, and it was not until 1
P.M. that our line was sufficiently far forward for us to proceed to
Ain Sinia for road repair. Even then the road was being so heavily
shelled that we had to make our way by side paths and across country.
We were busy road-repairing for the next day or two, and officers were
reconnoitring forward to see the lie of the country which we were to
take over.

On 14th March we moved on again, halting behind the skyline for the
midday meal while the C.O. and Company Commanders went on to see the
line we were to take over. It had been a rough journey. The tracks
were positively heart breaking. The usual pattern was 4 to 6 feet wide
with stout drystone walls on either side; the "pathway" being over
rough and uneven rocks with an occasional boulder, and here and there
the walls had collapsed completely, blocking the track--or else over
cultivated soil which was immediately converted into a muddy morass of
uncertain depth. On such paths only single file was possible, and pack
mules and donkeys had to be almost carried over some of the places.
But the worst was yet to come, and though we were not intended to go
down into the Wadi Kolah by day as it was in full view to the Turkish
artillery, the track down was so bad the C.O. wisely preferred risking
a shell or two to certain suicide going down in the dark. A mist
helped us, and we got down unmolested and had taken over the new line
by 5 P.M. The track down into the wadi was so steep and slippery from
the rain that donkeys were act