cise the testing right pending the speedy introduction of a
measure safeguarding the independence of the courts. Mr. Kruger on
his side promised to refrain from enforcing the provisions of Law 1
of 1897, and undertook to introduce as speedily as possible the
required new law.

The position in which the President found himself was undoubtedly one
of some difficulty, but he chose a very bad way out of it.
High-handed arbitrary methods cannot effect a permanent and
satisfactory solution of a question of that character, but Mr. Kruger
was unwilling to go to the root of the evil and to admit what Mr.
Kotze's judgment had brought home with perhaps too sudden force,
namely, that the laws and system of Government were in a condition of
complete chaos. The sequel can be told in a few words. In February,
1898, Mr. Kotze considered that ample time had been allowed by him
for the fulfilment of President Kruger's promise. Sir Henry de
Villiers thought it proper to allow more time. The point of
difference between Mr. Kotze and Sir Henry de Villiers was the
interpretation to be placed upon the expression 'this session,' which
had been used in the previous February when the President had said
that if he did not introduce the proposed measures this session, the
judges might consider that he had failed to keep his promise. Mr.
Kotze contended that as the Raad was then in session it meant _that
Session_, and that in any case that session and another had passed,
and a third was in progress and there was still no sign of the
promised measures. Sir Henry de Villiers stated that in his opinion
the reasonable construction would be that Mr. Kruger meant the
following _ordinary_ session, and that only ordinary sessions could
be considered (for in each year there are one special and one
ordinary session), so that the President might be entitled to claim
the whole of the year 1898 within which to fulfil his promise, but
that this would be the extreme limit of forbearance, after which
failure could only be regarded as a breach of faith. Sir Henry de
Villiers in fact defended Mr. Kruger. Mr. Kotze, however, held to his
opinion; he wrote to the President reminding him of the undertaking,
charged him with failure to keep his promise and withdrew the pledge
which he had given. The President promptly exercised his right under
Law 1 of 1897, and dismissed Mr. Kotze, who had served the country as
judge and chief justice for over twenty years. Whatever th