berty to use whenever it suits them, Rietfontein
called to Bulwaan, and Blaauwbank in the west echoed the dull boom that
came from the distant flat-topped hill in the east. Then along our main
positions, against the Leicesters and Rifles on one side, and the
Manchesters on another, an attack by rifles developed quickly.
Intermittently these skirmishes lasted most of the day, our enemy never
pressing his attack home, but contenting himself with long-range
shooting from good cover. Neither heavy guns nor small arms did much
damage. Major Grant, R.E., of the Intelligence Staff, was slightly
wounded as he sat coolly sketching the scene of hostilities as he saw it
from the front of Caesar's Camp. A lieutenant of the Manchesters and
three men of the Leicester Regiment were also hit by rifle bullets or
shell splinters, but none very seriously.
CHAPTER V
THE FIRST BOER ASSAULT
Joubert's boast--The preliminaries of attack--Shells in the town--A
simultaneous advance--Observation Hill threatened--A wary enemy--A
prompt repulse--Attack on Tunnel Hill--The colour-sergeant's last
words--Manchesters under fire--Prone behind boulders--A Royal
salute--The Prince of Wales's birthday--Stretching the Geneva
Convention--The redoubtable Miss Maggie--The Boer Foreign
Legion--Renegade Irishmen--A signal failure.
From the first moment of complete investment here my belief (continues
Mr. Pearse, writing on 9th November) has been that the Boers would never
venture to push an infantry attack against this place to the point of a
determined assault. This opinion is strengthened by to-day's events. Yet
it is said that Joubert believes he could take Ladysmith by a _coup de
main_ at any time were it not for his fear of mines, which he believes
have been secretly laid at many points round our positions. His riflemen
certainly did not come close enough to test the truth of this belief
to-day, but contented themselves with shooting from very safe cover at
long ranges. If they could have shaken our troops at any point they
would doubtless have taken advantage of it to push forward and take up
other equally sheltered positions, whence they might have practised
their peculiar tactics with possibly greater effect. These methods,
however, lack the boldness necessary for an assault on positions held by
disciplined troops, and having no single objective they are gradually
frittered away in isolated and futile
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