ar form, size, etc., are pretty certainly obtained.

The second step in this process of presentative construction is the
recognition of an object as one of a class of things, for example,
oranges, having certain special qualities, as a particular taste. In
this step the connections of experience are less deeply organized, and
so we are able to some extent, by reflection, to recognize it as a kind
of intellectual working up of the materials supplied us by the past. It
is to be noted that this process of recognition involves a compound
operation of classifying impressions as distinguished from that simple
operation by which a single impression, such as a particular colour, is
known. Thus the recognition of such an object as an orange takes place
by a rapid classing of a multitude of passive sensations of colour,
light, and shade, and those active or muscular sensations which are
supposed to enter into the visual perception of form.

A still less automatic step in the process of visual recognition is that
of identifying individual objects, as Westminster Abbey, or a friend,
John Smith. The amount of experience that is here reproduced may be very
large, as in the case of recognizing a person with whom we have had a
long and intimate acquaintance.

If the recognition of an object as one of a class, for example, an
orange, involves a compound process of classing impressions, that of an
individual object involves a still more complicated process. The
identification of a friend, simple as this operation may at first
appear, really takes place by a rapid classing of all the salient
characteristic features which serve as the visible marks of that
particular person.

It is to be noted that each kind of recognition, specific and
individual, takes place by a consciousness of likeness amid unlikeness.
It is obvious that a new individual object has characters not shared in
by other objects previously inspected. Thus, we at once class a man with
a dark-brown skin, wearing a particular garb, as a Hindoo, though he may
differ in a host of particulars from the other Hindoos that we have
observed. In thus instantly recognizing him as a Hindoo, we must, it is
plain, attend to the points of similarity, and overlook for the instant
the points of dissimilarity. In the case of individual identification,
the same thing happens. Strictly speaking, no object ever appears
exactly the same to us on two occasions. Apart from changes in the
object