elings in the manner hinted
above, and if so, what is the range of such error? In order to
appreciate the risks of such error, let us compare the process of
self-observation with that of external perception with respect to the
difficulties in the way of accurate presentative knowledge.

_Misreading of Internal Feelings._

First of all, it is noteworthy that a state of consciousness at any one
moment is an exceedingly complex thing. It is made up of a mass of
feelings and active impulses which often combine and blend in a most
inextricable way. External sensations come in groups, too, but as a rule
they do not fuse in apparently simple wholes as our internal feelings
often do. The very possibility of perception depends on a clear
discrimination of sense-elements, for example, the several sensations
of colour obtained by the stimulation of different parts of the
retina.[103] But no such clearly defined mosaic of feelings presents
itself in the internal region: one element overlaps and partly loses
itself in another, and subjective analysis is often an exceedingly
difficult matter. Our consciousness is thus a closely woven texture in
which the mental eye often fails to trace the several threads or
strands. Moreover, there is the fact that many of these ingredients are
exceedingly shadowy, belonging to that obscure region of
sub-consciousness which it is so hard to penetrate with the light of
discriminative attention. This remark applies with particular force to
that mass of organic feelings which constitutes what is known as
coenaesthesis; or vital sense.

While, to speak figuratively, the minute anatomy of consciousness is
thus difficult with respect to longitudinal sections of the mental
column, it is no less difficult with respect to transverse sections.
Under ordinary circumstances, external impressions persist so that they
can be transfixed by a deliberate act of attention, and objects rarely
flit over the external scene so rapidly as to allow us no time for a
careful recognition of the impression. Not so in the case of the
internal region of mind. The composite states of consciousness just
described never remain perfectly uniform for the shortest conceivable
duration. They change continually, just as the contents of the
kaleidoscope vary with every shake of the instrument. Thus, one shade
of feeling runs into another in such a way that it is often impossible
to detect its exact quality; and even when the charact