p. 315.

*** Knyghton, p. 2686. Statutes at large, 10 Rich. II. chap.
I.

{1887.} The king, thus dispossessed of royal power, was soon sensible of
the contempt into which he was fallen. His favorites and ministers, who
were as yet allowed to remain about his person, failed not to aggravate
the injury which without any demerit on his part, had been offered to
him. And his eager temper was of itself sufficiently inclined to remark
that the dukes of Glocester and York, though vastly rich received at
the same time each of them a thousand pounds a year top support their
dignity and to seek the means, both of recovering his authority, and of
revenging himself on those who had invaded it. As the house of commons
appeared now of weight in the constitution, he secretly tried some
expedients for procuring a favorable election: he sounded some of the
sheriffs, who, being at that time both the returning officers, and
magistrates of great power in the counties, had naturally considerable
influence in elections.[*] But as most of them had been appointed by his
uncles, either during his minority or during the course of the present
commission, he found them in general averse to his enterprise. The
sentiments and inclinations of the judges were more favorable to him.
He met at Nottingham Sir Robert Tresilian, chief justice of the king's
bench, Sir Robert Belknappe, chief justice of the common pleas, Sir John
Gary, chief baron of the exchequer, Holt, Fulthorpe, and Bourg, inferior
justices, and Lockton, serjeant at law; and he proposed to them some
queries, which these lawyers, either from the influence of his authority
or of reason, made no scruple of answering in the way he desired. They
declared that the late commission was derogatory to the royalty and
prerogative of the king; that those who procured it, or advised the
king to consent to it, were punishable with death; that those who
necessitated and compelled him were guilty of treason; that those were
equally criminal who should persevere in maintaining it; that the
king has the right of dissolving parliaments at pleasure; that the
parliament, while it sits, must first proceed upon the king's business;
and that this assembly cannot without his consent impeach any of his
ministers and judges.[**] Even according to our present strict maxims
with regard to law and the royal prerogative, all these determinations,
except the two last, appear justifiable: and as the great pri