powers to the full, whether the people liked it
or not. The Cuban Autonomists in the United States, where many of them
deemed it prudent to remain, did not suffer from the illusions of their
compatriots in Cuba, and generally expressed dissatisfaction with the
scheme, or at least reserved their judgment upon it.
The Spanish Reformists in Cuba also approved the scheme. They had
deserted and betrayed Campos, and had been ignored by Weyler. Now they
struggled to return to public recognition and influence. True, they had
never before wanted or approved autonomy. But they saw that now they
must do so or remain in retirement. So they joined hands with the Cuban
Autonomists, congratulated the Spanish government, and pledged their
loyalty to Blanco. This gave the Spanish government ground for its
exultant belief that these two parties had united in its support, and
would probably control the island in behalf of autonomy.
But there were still the Constitutionalists to be reckoned with. They
were implacable. They had shown in their convention a few weeks before
their hostility to autonomy. They had ostracised Blanco. Now they
proceeded to further extremes. They organized riotous disturbances in
Havana, and made violent demonstrations against Blanco and, which was in
some respects more serious, against the American government and the
American citizens in Cuba. So ominous did these disturbances become at
the middle of January that the Consul-General, Fitzhugh Lee, was driven
to request the sending of a war ship to Havana harbor for the protection
of American citizens. In consequence, on January 24 the cruiser _Maine_
was sent to Havana. This action was taken after consultation with the
Spanish government, in which that government expressed great pleasure at
the prospect of thus having a friendly visit of the American vessel to
Cuban waters, and arranged to have its own cruiser the _Vizcaya_ make a
return visit to New York.
This was not satisfactory, however, to the Spanish Minister at
Washington, Senor Dupuy de Lome, who having failed to bring President
McKinley to his own point of view of Cuban affairs, showed plainly his
animosity against that gentleman, and wrote a letter to a personal
friend characterizing the President as a vacillating and time-serving
politician. This letter through some clandestine means was placed in the
hands of the United States Secretary of State, who at once sent for the
Minister and asked him plu
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