"For
God's sake, make haste and get those things," he comprehended what
"things" were indicated, without definition, and brought forth both
carbines and whisky. He testifies that John H. Surratt had told
him, when depositing the weapons in concealment in his house, that
they would soon be called for, but did not instruct him, it seems,
by whom they would be demanded.

All facts connecting Lloyd with the case tend to his implication and
guilt, and to prove that he adopted the _dernier_ _ressort_ of guilt--
accusation and inculpation of another. In case Lloyd were innocent
and Mrs. Surratt the guilty coadjutrix and messenger of the
conspirators, would not Lloyd have been able to cite so many open
and significant remarks and acts of Mrs. Surratt that he would not
have been obliged to recall, in all perversion and weakness of
uncertainty, deeds and speech so common and unmeaning as his
testimony includes?

It is upon these considerations that we feel ourselves safe and
reasonable in the position that there are facts and circumstances,
both external and internal, connected with the testimony of
Weichmann and Lloyd, which, if they do not destroy, do certainly
greatly shake their credibility, and which, under the rule that will
give Mrs. Surratt the benefit of all reasonable doubts, seem to
forbid that she should be convicted upon the unsupported evidence of
these two witnesses. But even admitting the facts to be proven as
above recited, it remains to be seen where is the guilty knowledge
of the contemplated assassination; and this brings us to the inquiry
whether these facts are not explainable so as to exclude guilt.

From one of the most respected of legal authorities the following is
taken:--

"Whenever, therefore, the evidence leaves it indifferent which of
several hypotheses is true, or merely establishes some finite
probability in favor of one hypothesis rather than another, such
evidence cannot amount to proof. The maxim of the law is that it is
better that ninety-nine offenders should escape than that one
innocent man should be condemned." (Starkie on Evidence.)

The acts of Mrs. Surratt must have been accompanied with criminal
intent in order to make them criminal. If any one supposes that any
such intent existed, the supposition comes alone from inference. If
disloyal acts and constant disloyal practices, if overt and open
action against the government, on her part, had been shown down to
the day of t