n undesignedly, in aiming at him who gave the
provocation, according to Judge Foster; and as this point is of such
consequence, I must produce some more authorities for it:

(1 Hawkins. 84): "Also, if a third person accidentally happen to be
killed by one engaged in a combat, upon a sudden quarrel, it seems
that he who killed him is guilty of manslaughter only," etc. (H. H
P. C. 442, to the same point; and 1 H. H. P. C. 484. and 4 Black,
27.)

I shall now consider one question more, and that is concerning
provocation. We have hitherto been considering self-defense, and
how far persons may go in defending themselves against aggressors,
even by taking away their lives, and now proceed to consider such
provocations as the law allows to mitigate or extenuate the guilt of
killing, where it is not justifiable or excusable. An assault and
battery committed upon a man in such a manner as not to endanger his
life is such a provocation as the law allows to reduce killing down
to the crime of manslaughter. Now, the law has been made on more
considerations than we are capable of making at present; the law
considers a man as capable of bearing anything and everything but
blows. I may reproach a man as much as I please; I may call him a
thief, robber, traitor, scoundrel, coward, lobster, bloody-back,
etc., and if he kill me it will be murder, if nothing else but words
precede; but if from giving him such kind of language I proceed to
take him by the nose, or fillip him on the forehead, that is an
assault; that is a blow. The law will not oblige a man to stand
still and bear it; there is the distinction. Hands off; touch me
not. As soon as you touch me, if I run you through the heart, it is
but manslaughter. The utility of this distinction, the more you
think of it the more you will be satisfied with it. It is an
assault whenever a blow is struck, let it be ever so slight, and
sometimes even without a blow. The law considers man as frail and
passionate. When his passions are touched, he will be thrown off
his guard, and therefore the law makes allowance for this frailty
--considers him as in a fit of passion, not having the possession of
his intellectual faculties, and therefore does not oblige him to
measure out his blows with a yard-stick, or weigh them in a scale.
Let him kill with a sword, gun, or hedge-stake, it is not murder,
but only manslaughter.

(Keyling's Report, 135. Regina _versus_ Mawgrige.) "Rules suppor