ters, and they felt somewhat jaded and worn out when they
came upon their bristling bayonets, ready for combat. A great number
of our men were barefooted, some with shoes partly worn out, clothes
ragged and torn, not an overcoat or extra garment among the line
officers or men throughout the army, as all surplus baggage had
been left in Virginia. But when the battle was about to show up the
soldiers were on hand, ready and willing as of old, to plunge headlong
into the fray. McLaws was on the left wing and Jenkins on the right.

Preparation for a general engagement was made. McLaws was ordered
to throw forward, Wofford on his extreme left, supported by cavalry,
while Jenkins was to send two of his brigades, under General Law, far
to the right, on the flank and rear of the enemy's left. Law was first
to make the attack on the enemy's flank, then the columns in front
were to advance and make direct assault. But the "best laid plans
of mice and men oft' gang aglee." Law missed his line of
direction--failed to come upon the enemy's flank, night was upon us,
and it must be remembered that all these movements took time, thus
giving the Union Army an opportunity, under the sable curtains of
night, to "fold their tents and gently steal away."

General Longstreet, in his book written nearly thirty years after the
occurrence of Cambell's Station, severely criticises General Law, who
commanded the two flanking brigades, and in withering and scathing
terms directly charges him with the loss of a great victory. He quotes
one of his staff officers as saying that it was the common camp
rumor that General Law had made the remark "that he could have made
a successful attack, but that Jenkins would have reaped the credit
of it, hence he delayed until the enemy got out of the way." This is
unjust and ungenerous to a gallant and faithful officer, one, too,
who had, by his many and heavy blows in battle, added largely to
the immortal fame of Longstreet himself. That there was a laudable
ambition and rivalry among all officers and men in the Confederate
Army, there can be no question--an ambition to outstrip all others
in heroic actions, noble deeds, and self-sacrificing, but jealously
never. As for treachery, as General Longstreet clearly intimates in
the case of General Law, why the poorest, ragged, starved, or maimed
soldier in the South would not have sold his country or companions for
the wealth of the Indies, nor would he have unnecess