he ministerial policy both at home and abroad; but, in
spite of this political harmony, a certain degree of bad feeling existed
between them, which on one occasion led to a somewhat singular scene in
the House of Commons. The Commons imputed its origin to the discourtesy
of the Lords, who, when members of the Commons were ordered by their
House to carry its bills up to the peers, sometimes kept them "waiting
three hours in the lobby among their lordships' footmen before they
admitted them." Burke affirmed that this had happened to himself, and
that he "spoke of it, not out of any personal pride, nor as an indignity
to himself, but as a flagrant disgrace to the House of Commons, which,
he apprehended, was not inferior in rank to any other branch of the
Legislature, but co-ordinate with them." And the irritation which such
treatment excited led the Commons, perhaps not very unnaturally, to seek
some opportunity to vindicate their dignity. They found it in an
amendment which the Lords made on a corn bill. In the middle of April,
1772, resolutions had been passed by the Commons, in a committee of the
whole House, imposing certain duties on the importation of wheat[30] and
other grain when they were at a certain price, which was fixed at 48s.,
and granting bounties on exportation when the price fell below 44s. The
Lords made several amendments on the bill, and, among others, one to
strike out the clause which granted bounties. But when the bill thus
amended came back to the Commons, even those who disliked the principle
of bounties resented this act of the Lords in meddling with that
question, which they regarded as a violation of their peculiar and most
cherished privilege, the exclusive right of dealing with questions of
taxation. Governor Pownall, who had charge of the bill, declared that
the Lords had forgotten their duty when they interfered in raising money
by the insertion of a clause that "no bounty should be paid upon
exported corn." And on this ground he moved the rejection of the
bill.[31] In the last chapter of this volume, a more fitting occasion
for examining the rights and usages of the House of Lords with respect
to money-bills will be furnished by a series of resolutions on the
subject, moved by the Prime-minister of the day. It is sufficient here
to say that the power of rejection is manifestly so different from that
of originating grants--which is admitted to belong exclusively to the
Commons--and that there