* Wilson vs. Blackbird Creek Marsh Company (1829), 2 Peters, 245.

* * Providence Bank vs. Billings (1830), 4 Peters, 514.

* * * Satterlee vs. Matthewson (1829), 2 Peters, 380; and Watson
vs. Mercer (1834), 8 Peters, 110.

* * * * Barron vs. Baltimore (1833), 7 Peters, 243.

* * * * * See in this connection the Chief Justice's remarks in
Briscoe vs. Bank of Kentucky, 8 Peters, 118.

Despite all these concessions which he made to the rising spirit of the
times, Marshall found his last years to be among the most trying of
his chief justiceship. Jackson, who was now President, felt himself the
chosen organ of "the People's will" and was not disposed to regard as
binding anybody's interpretation of the Constitution except his own. The
West and Southwest, the pocket boroughs of the new Administration, were
now deep in land speculation and clamorous for financial expedients
which the Constitution banned. John Taylor of Caroline had just finished
his task of defining the principles of constitutional construction which
were requisite to convert the Union into a league of States and had laid
his work at the feet of Calhoun. Taylor was a candid man and frankly
owned the historical difficulties in the way of carrying out his
purpose; but Calhoun's less scrupulous dialectic swept aside every
obstacle that stood in the way of attributing to the States the
completest sovereignty.

In Craig vs. Missouri (1830) * the Court was confronted with a case in
which a State had sought to evade the prohibition of the Constitution
against the emission of bills of credit by establishing loan offices
with authority to issue loan certificates intended to circulate
generally in dimensions of fifty cents to ten dollars and to be
receivable for taxes. A plainer violation of the Constitution would be
difficult to imagine. Yet Marshall's decision setting aside the act was
followed by a renewed effort to procure the repeal of Section XXV of
the Judiciary Act. The discussion of the proposal threw into interesting
contrast two points of view. The opponents of this section insisted
upon regarding constitutional cases as controversies between the United
States and the States in their corporate capacities; its advocates, on
the other hand, treated the section as an indispensable safeguard of
private rights. In the end, the latter point of view prevailed: the bill
to repeal, which had come up in the House, was rejected by a vote of 138
to