misled,
we shall be able to see that the whole thing is the most arrant Quixotism
that was ever enacted before a community. What is the matter of popular
sovereignty? The first thing, in order to understand it, is to get a good
definition of what it is, and after that to see how it is applied.
I suppose almost every one knows that, in this controversy, whatever has
been said has had reference to the question of negro slavery. We have not
been in a controversy about the right of the people to govern themselves
in the ordinary matters of domestic concern in the States and Territories.
Mr. Buchanan, in one of his late messages (I think when he sent up the
Lecompton Constitution) urged that the main point to which the public
attention had been directed was not in regard to the great variety of
small domestic matters, but was directed to the question of negro slavery;
and he asserts that if the people had had a fair chance to vote on that
question there was no reasonable ground of objection in regard to minor
questions. Now, while I think that the people had not had given, or
offered, them a fair chance upon that slavery question, still, if
there had been a fair submission to a vote upon that main question, the
President's proposition would have been true to the utmost. Hence, when
hereafter I speak of popular sovereignty, I wish to be understood as
applying what I say to the question of slavery only, not to other minor
domestic matters of a Territory or a State.
Does Judge Douglas, when he says that several of the past years of his
life have been devoted to the question of "popular sovereignty," and that
all the remainder of his life shall be devoted to it, does he mean to
say that he has been devoting his life to securing to the people of the
Territories the right to exclude slavery from the Territories? If he means
so to say he means to deceive; because he and every one knows that the
decision of the Supreme Court, which he approves and makes especial ground
of attack upon me for disapproving, forbids the people of a Territory to
exclude slavery. This covers the whole ground, from the settlement of a
Territory till it reaches the degree of maturity entitling it to form a
State Constitution. So far as all that ground is concerned, the Judge
is not sustaining popular sovereignty, but absolutely opposing it.
He sustains the decision which declares that the popular will of the
Territory has no constitutional power to exclu
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