r days earlier, "God preserve the Union is my daily prayer, in
and out of church". [55]
Webster however, as late as February 14, believed that there was no
"serious danger". February 16, he still felt that "if, on our side, we
keep cool, things will come to no dangerous pass". [56] But within the
next week, three acts in Washington modified Webster's optimism:
the filibuster of Southern members, February 18; their triumph in
conference, February 19; their interview with Taylor about February 23.
On February 18, under the leadership of Stephens, the Southern
representatives mustered two-thirds of the Southern Whigs and a majority
from every Southern state save Maryland for a successful series of over
thirty filibustering votes against the admission of California without
consideration of the question of slavery in New Mexico and Utah. So
indisputable was the demonstration of Southern power to block not
only the President's plan but all Congressional legislation, that the
Northern leaders next day in conference with. Southern representatives
agreed that California should be admitted with her free constitution,
but that in New Mexico and Utah government should be organized with no
prohibition of slavery and with power to form, in respect to slavery,
such constitutions as the people pleased--agreements practically enacted
in the Compromise. [57]
The filibuster of the 18th of February, Mann described as "a
revolutionary proceeding". Its alarming effect on the members of the
Cabinet was commented upon by the Boston Advertiser, February 19. The
New York Tribune, February 20, recognized the determination of the
South to secede unless the Missouri Compromise line were extended to the
Pacific. February 22, the Springfield Republican declared that "if the
Union cannot be preserved" without the extension of slavery, "we allow
the tie of Union to be severed". It was on this day, that Webster
decided "to make a Union speech and discharge a clear conscience".
That same week (apparently February 23) occurred the famous interview of
Stephens and Toombs with Taylor which convinced the President that the
Southern movement "means disunion". This was Taylor's judgment expressed
to Weed and Hamlin, "ten minutes after the interview". A week later the
President seemed to Horace Mann to be talking like a child about his
plans to levy an embargo and blockade the Southern harbors and "save the
Union". Taylor was ready to appeal to arms agai
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