FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   139   140   141   142   143   144   145   146   147   148   149   150   151   152   153   154   155   >>  
our doctrine; but to try to eliminate them, as certain affected objectivists of sociology would willingly do, is pure capriciousness. And to conclude, the partisan of historical materialism who sets himself the task of explaining, or relating, cannot do it through schemes. History has always received a definite form, with an infinite number of accidents and variations. It has a certain grouping, it has a certain perspective. It is not enough to have eliminated preventively the hypothesis of factors, because the narrator constantly finds himself in the presence of things which seem incongruous, independent, and self-directing. To present the whole as a whole, and to discover in it the continuous relations of the events which border on each other, there is the difficulty. The sum of events narrowly consecutive and precise gives the whole of history; and this is equivalent to saying that it is all that we know of our being, in so far as we are social beings and not simply natural beings. XII. In the successive whole, and in the continuous necessity of all historical events, is there, then, some ask, any meaning, any significance? This question, whether it comes from the camp of the idealists, or whether it comes to us from the mouth of the most circumspect critics, certainly, and in all cases, demands our attention, and requires an adequate answer. In fact, if we stop at the premises, intuitive or intellectual, from which is derived the conception of _progress_ as an idea which incloses and embraces the total of the human _processus_, it is seen that these presumptions all rest upon the mental need, which is in us, of attributing to one or more series of events a certain sense and a certain signification. The conception of progress, for whoever examines it carefully in its specific nature, always implies judgments of estimation, and therefore, there is no one who can confuse it with the crude and bare notion of simple development, which does not contain that increment of clue which makes us say of a thing that it is progressing. I have already said, and, it seems to me, at sufficient length, how it is that progress does not exist as something imperative or regulative over the natural and immediate succession of the generations of men. That is as intuitive as is the actual coexistence of peoples, of nations and of states, which find themselves, at the same time, in a different stage of development;
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   139   140   141   142   143   144   145   146   147   148   149   150   151   152   153   154   155   >>  



Top keywords:

events

 

progress

 
natural
 

conception

 

development

 

intuitive

 

beings

 

continuous

 

historical

 

signification


mental

 
series
 
attributing
 

examines

 
implies
 
judgments
 

estimation

 

nature

 

specific

 

carefully


presumptions

 

premises

 

affected

 

intellectual

 

derived

 

objectivists

 

adequate

 

answer

 

eliminate

 
processus

incloses

 

embraces

 
confuse
 

succession

 

generations

 
imperative
 

regulative

 
actual
 

coexistence

 
peoples

nations

 

states

 

length

 
doctrine
 

increment

 

simple

 
notion
 

requires

 

sufficient

 
progressing