e it more difficult to bring about that intelligent political
co-operation so much needed to check the greed of organized wealth.

The limitation of governmental powers in the Constitution of the United
States was not designed to prevent all interference in business, but
only such as was conceived to be harmful to the dominant class. The
nature of these limitations as well as the means of enforcing them
indicate their purpose. The provision relating to direct taxes is a good
example. The framers of the Constitution were desirous of preventing any
use of the taxing power by the general government that would be
prejudicial to the interests of the well-to-do classes. This is the
significance of the provision that no direct taxes shall be laid unless
in proportion to population.[182] The only kind of a direct tax which
the framers intended that the general government should have power to
levy was the poll tax which would demand as much from the poor man as
from the rich. This was indeed one of the reasons for opposing the
ratification of the Constitution.

"Many specters," said Hamilton, "have been raised out of this power of
internal taxation to excite the apprehensions of the people: double sets
of revenue officers, a duplication of their burdens by double taxations,
and the frightful forms of odious and oppressive poll-taxes, have been
played off with all the ingenious dexterity of political legerdemain....

"As little friendly as I am to the species of imposition [poll-taxes], I
still feel a thorough conviction that the power of having recourse to it
ought to exist in the Federal government. There are certain emergencies
of nations, in which expedients, that in the ordinary state of things
ought to be forborne, become essential to the public weal. And the
government, from the possibility of such emergencies, ought ever to have
the option of making use of them."[183]

It is interesting to observe that Hamilton's argument in defense of the
power to levy poll-taxes would have been much more effective if it had
been urged in support of the power to levy a direct tax laid in
proportion to wealth. But this kind of a tax would, in the opinion of
the framers, have placed too heavy a burden upon the well-to-do. Hence
they were willing to deprive the general government of the power to levy
it even at the risk of crippling it in some great emergency when there
might be urgent need of a large revenue.

This is not strange, howe