with
shorter and safer communications, and one gathers how formidable a task
lay before the soldiers of the Empire. When we turn from such an
enumeration of their strength to contemplate the 12,000 men, split into
two detachments, who awaited them in Natal, we may recognise that, far
from bewailing our disasters, we should rather congratulate ourselves
upon our escape from losing that great province which, situated as it is
between Britain, India, and Australia, must be regarded as the very
keystone of the imperial arch.

But again one must ask whether in the face of these figures it is still
possible to maintain that Great Britain was deliberately attempting to
overthrow by force the independence of the republics.

There was a lull in the political exchanges after the receipt of the
Transvaal despatch of September 16, which rejected the British proposals
of September 8. In Africa all hope or fear of peace had ended. The Raads
had been dissolved and the old President's last words had been that war
was certain, with a stern invocation of the Lord as the final arbiter.
Britain was ready less obtrusively, but no less heartily, to refer the
quarrel to the same dread judge.

On October 2 President Steyn informed Sir Alfred Milner that he had
deemed it necessary to call out the Free State burghers--that is, to
mobilise his forces. Sir A. Milner wrote regretting these preparations,
and declaring that he did not yet despair of peace, for he was sure that
any reasonable proposal would be favourably considered by her Majesty's
Government. Steyn's reply was that there was no use in negotiating
unless the stream of British reinforcements ceased coming into South
Africa. As our forces were still in a great minority, it was impossible
to stop the reinforcements, so the correspondence led to nothing. On
October 7 the army reserves for the First Army Corps were called out in
Great Britain, and other signs shown that it had been determined to send
a considerable force to South Africa. Parliament was also summoned, that
the formal national assent might be gained for those grave measures
which were evidently pending.

It has been stated that it was the action of the British in calling out
the reserves which caused the ultimatum from the Boers and so
precipitated the war. Such a contention is absurd, for it puts the cart
before the horse. The Transvaal commandos had mobilised upon September
27, and those of the Free State on October 2.