d by
becoming innumerable. As the individualization and the specification of
beings in the knowledge of God were the Essence of Unity itself, and as
there was not any difference between them, there was but one veritable
Unity, and all the things known were diffused and included in the reality
of the one Essence--that is to say, that, according to the mode of
simplicity and of unity, they constitute the knowledge of God the Most
High, and the Essence of the Reality. When God manifested His glory, these
individualizations and these specifications of beings which had a virtual
existence--that is to say, which were a form of the Divine Knowledge--found
their existence substantiated in the external world; and this Real
Existence resolved Itself into infinite forms. Such is the foundation of
their argument.
The Theosophists and the Sufis are divided into two branches: one,
comprising the mass, who, simply in the spirit of imitation, believe
pantheism without comprehending the meaning of their renowned savants; for
the mass of the Sufis believe that the signification of Being is general
existence, taken substantively, which is comprehended by the reason and
the intelligence--that is to say, that man comprehends it. Instead of that,
this general existence is one of the accidents which penetrate the reality
of beings, and the qualities of beings are the essence. This accidental
existence, which is dependent on beings, is like other properties of
things which depend on them. It is an accident among accidents, and
certainly that which is the essence is superior to that which is the
accident. For the essence is the origin, and the accident is the
consequence; the essence is dependent on itself, and the accident is
dependent on something else--that is to say, it needs an essence upon which
to depend. In this case, God would be the consequence of the creature. He
would have need of it, and it would be independent of Him.
For example, each time that the isolated elements combine conformably to
the divine universal system, one being among beings comes into the world.
That is to say, that when certain elements combine, a vegetable existence
is produced; when others combine, it is an animal; again others combine,
and they produce different creatures. In this case, the existence of
things is the consequence of their reality: how could it be that this
existence, which is an accident among accidents, and necessitates another
essence upon
|