to Ecclus. 15:14: "God made man from the beginning and left
him in the hand of his own counsel." Now it is evident that man is
ordained to something as his end: since man is not the supreme good.
Therefore the last end of man's reason and will cannot be the
preservation of man's being.

Secondly, because, granted that the end of man's will and reason be
the preservation of man's being, it could not be said that the end of
man is some good of the body. For man's being consists in soul and
body; and though the being of the body depends on the soul, yet the
being of the human soul depends not on the body, as shown above (I,
Q. 75, A. 2); and the very body is for the soul, as matter for its
form, and the instruments for the man that puts them into motion,
that by their means he may do his work. Wherefore all goods of the
body are ordained to the goods of the soul, as to their end.
Consequently happiness, which is man's last end, cannot consist in
goods of the body.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as the body is ordained to the soul, as its end,
so are external goods ordained to the body itself. And therefore it
is with reason that the good of the body is preferred to external
goods, which are signified by "riches," just as the good of the soul
is preferred to all bodily goods.

Reply Obj. 2: Being taken simply, as including all perfection of
being, surpasses life and all that follows it; for thus being itself
includes all these. And in this sense Dionysius speaks. But if we
consider being itself as participated in this or that thing, which
does not possess the whole perfection of being, but has imperfect
being, such as the being of any creature; then it is evident that
being itself together with an additional perfection is more
excellent. Hence in the same passage Dionysius says that things that
live are better than things that exist, and intelligent better than
living things.

Reply Obj. 3: Since the end corresponds to the beginning; this
argument proves that the last end is the first beginning of being, in
Whom every perfection of being is: Whose likeness, according to their
proportion, some desire as to being only, some as to living being,
some as to being which is living, intelligent and happy. And this
belongs to few.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 2, Art. 5]

Whether Man's Happiness Consists in Pleasure?

Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in pleasure.
For since happiness is th