,
pour approvisionner l'Isle Royale [_Cape Breton_] et tomber en cas de
guerre sur l'Acadie." Rameau, I. 133.]
[Footnote 242: _Supra_, p. 102.]
On the part of France, an invasion of the Acadian peninsula seemed more
than likely. Honor demanded of her that, having incited the Acadians to
disaffection, and so brought on them the indignation of the English
authorities, she should intervene to save them from the consequences.
Moreover the loss of the Acadian peninsula had been gall and wormwood to
her; and in losing it she had lost great material advantages. Its
possession was necessary to connect Canada with the Island of Cape
Breton and the fortress of Louisbourg. Its fertile fields and
agricultural people would furnish subsistence to the troops and
garrisons in the French maritime provinces, now dependent on supplies
illicitly brought by New England traders, and liable to be cut off in
time of war when they were needed most. The harbors of Acadia, too,
would be invaluable as naval stations from which to curb and threaten
the northern English colonies. Hence the intrigues so assiduously
practised to keep the Acadians French at heart, and ready to throw off
British rule at any favorable moment. British officers believed that
should a French squadron with a sufficient force of troops on board
appear in the Bay of Fundy, the whole population on the Basin of Mines
and along the Annapolis would rise in arms, and that the emigrants
beyond the isthmus, armed and trained by French officers, would come to
their aid. This emigrant population, famishing in exile, looked back
with regret to the farms they had abandoned; and, prevented as they were
by Le Loutre and his colleagues from making their peace with the
English, they would, if confident of success, have gladly joined an
invading force to regain their homes by reconquering Acadia for Louis
XV. In other parts of the continent it was the interest of France to put
off hostilities; if Acadia alone had been in question, it would have
been her interest to precipitate them.
Her chances of success were good. The French could at any time send
troops from Louisbourg or Quebec to join those maintained upon the
isthmus; and they had on their side of the lines a force of militia and
Indians amounting to about two thousand, while the Acadians within the
peninsula had about an equal number of fighting men who, while calling
themselves neutrals, might be counted on to join the invaders.
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