that there is a
distinction to be made in this case between wilful premeditated lying,
and the necessity men may be driven to by their disappointments, and
other accidents of their circumstances, to break such promises, as they
had made with an honest intention of performing them.

He that breaks a promise, however solemnly made, may be an honest man,
but he that makes a promise with a design to break it, or with no
resolution of performing it, cannot be so: nay, to carry it farther, he
that makes a promise, and does not do his endeavour to perform it, or to
put himself into a condition to perform it, cannot be an honest man. A
promise once made supposes the person willing to perform it, if it were
in his power, and has a binding influence upon the person who made it,
so far as his power extends, or that he can within the reach of any
reasonable ability perform the conditions; but if it is not in his power
to perform it, as in this affair of payment of money is often the case,
the man cannot be condemned as dishonest, unless it can be made appear,
either

1. That when he made the promise, he knew he should not be able to
perform it; or,

2. That he resolved when he made the promise not to perform it, though
he should be in a condition to do it. And in both these cases the
morality of promising cannot be justified, any more than the immorality
of not performing it.

But, on the other hand, the person promising, honestly intending when he
made the appointment to perform it if possible, and endeavouring
faithfully to be able, but being rendered unable by the disappointment
of those on whose promises he depended for the performance of his own; I
cannot say that such a tradesman can be charged with lying, or with any
immorality in promising, for the breach was not properly his own, but
the people's on whom he depended; and this is justified from what I said
before, namely, that every promise of that kind supposes the possibility
of such a disappointment, even in the very nature of its making; for, if
the man were not under a moral incapacity of payment, he would not
promise at all, but pay at the time he promised. His promising, then,
implies that he has only something future to depend upon, to capacitate
him for the payment; that is to say, the appointments of payment by
other tradesmen, who owe him (that promises) the money, or the daily
supply from the ordinary course of his trade, suppose him a retailer in
a shop, a