the arms of the Emperor, and there was a
huge flag of white damask sewn with representations of keys, communion
chalices, and the cross of Saint Andrew, in crimson, with a Latin
inscription. There were yet two others of scarlet damask "of the same
grandeur," embroidered round the edge with "Plus Ultra," the device of
Spain. Among a further varied assortment was one which bore the
inscription: "Send, O God, thine angel to guard him in all his goings."

The fleet under the command of Andrea Doria numbered sixty-two galleys and
one hundred and fifty nefs. There were also a miscellaneous assortment of
small craft, known in those days as "brigantines," employed in the carriage
of stores and ammunition. We have seen, on a former occasion, what terrible
losses attended one of these armadas when really bad weather was
encountered, and therefore it is not surprising that, on his second
venture, Charles should have selected the finest season of the year for his
descent upon the coast of Africa. They were brave men, these Mediterranean
seamen, and the risks which they ran in their strangely formed, unseaworthy
craft were of course much enhanced when they were loaded to the gunwale
with stores, provisions, horses, banners, and last, but by no means least,
a mob of seasick soldiery.

Into this armada were crowded twenty-five thousand infantry and six hundred
lancers with their horses.

Cagliari, in Sardinia, was the last rendezvous of the expedition, and here
it arrived in the early part of June, where a week was spent in making the
final preparations; and at last, on June 10th, a start was made for the
coast of Africa.

Meanwhile in Tunis Kheyr-ed-Din was working double tides. He was kept well
informed by his spies of all that was going on, and his preparations for
defence were as adequate as they could be made; the corsairs, as we have
said, had come flocking in at his call. He had withdrawn as many of his
fighting men from Algiers as he deemed prudent. Knowing that the attack was
directed against him personally, he had not much fear that it would be
diverted at the last moment. It would have been true strategy on the part
of Charles to have done this, but the Emperor considered that his honour
required that the attack should be an absolutely direct one, and so Algiers
was left on one side, to the ultimate upsetting of his plans. We say this
because, although in this case he was to take Tunis and to restore to the
throne of th