ss of St. Angelo, on
the banks of the Tiber, while a thanksgiving mass was celebrated in all
the churches. Pope Pius IV., as a special mark of his favor, offered La
Vallette a cardinal's hat; but the hero of Malta considered his position
far more elevated than that of a cardinal, and graciously declined the
honor.

CHAPTER XVI.

Result of the Siege.--Native Women serving as Soldiers.--The
Maltese Militia.--The Knights gain World-Wide Applause.--
Rage of Sultan Solyman.--Agents of the Grand Master become
Incendiaries.--La Vallette, Hero of the Siege.--The Order
still Piratical.--The Turks and Knights Affiliate.--Decadence
of the Chivalric Brotherhood.--Momentary Revival of the Old
Spirit.--Treacherous Surrender.--French Sovereignty.--End of
the Order.

Many interesting considerations suggest themselves in connection with
this remarkable siege. The lack of discipline which characterizes
Oriental soldiery was an element constantly operating against the
assailants. Had the siege opened on true engineering and military
principles, such an enormous and well-armed number of Turkish fighters
must have overwhelmed the Christians at the very outset. This, however,
was not the case. The siege seems to have been a series of blunders on
the part of the Ottomans from the beginning until the end, or at least
until the arrival of Admiral Dragut, who took partial command and gave
the operations the benefit of his great military experience. Henceforth
something like order and system were evolved from the utter confusion
which reigned supreme in the Turkish army.

The vast number of the Ottoman forces, compared with that of the
defenders of Malta, only served to emphasize their final and utter
defeat. True, there is a great difference between contending parties
when one is fighting in the open, while the other is protected by
well-constructed walls of stone, but the Turkish commander, though
foolhardy, was not blind, and he must have taken that into consideration
when he made his opening and reckless attack upon the stronghold of Fort
St. Elmo. It is quite possible that excessive numbers may prove an
element of disaster, under certain circumstances. This was exactly the
case in the first onslaught of the Ottomans, who came to the attack
almost in a solid body,--a mere reckless, over-confident mob,--relying
upon their numbers rather than upon any appropriate tactics. In after
as