ginning, I am not writing a history of the war, and hence will
not attempt to follow the movements of the Western armies.
The question is often asked, "Why did Gen. Lee take his army into
Pennsylvania?" That question is easily answered.
For the same reason that the children of Israel went down into Egypt.
There was a famine in the land, and they went there for corn. Food was
growing scarcer and scarcer in the South, and it became a serious
question not only as to how the army was to be fed, but also the
citizens at home, the old men, women and children.
No supplies could be brought from beyond the Mississippi. Tennessee and
Kentucky were in the hands of the enemy, a great portion of Virginia; in
fact, the richest farming sections were ravished first by one army, then
by the other, making it impossible for the farmers to put in their
grain or reap their harvests.
The other States of the South grew mostly cotton and tobacco. All the
Southern ports were closely blockaded; hence the problem of sustaining
human life was growing more serious every day.
If Gen. Lee had been successful at the battle of Gettysburg his army
would have remained north of the Potomac until late in the fall, and
would have subsisted upon the country surrounding his camps. At the same
time, the farmers on the eastern side of the Blue Ridge and in the rich
valley of Virginia could have planted and reaped an abundant harvest,
which would have sufficed to have taken care of man and beast during the
long winter months; but Providence ruled otherwise, and Lee was
compelled to move his army back and provide for it as best he could.
Another question has been as often asked. "Why was Lee not successful at
Gettysburg?" Gen. Lee seemed to have anticipated this question, and
answered it in language almost divine when he said, "It was all my
fault." He hoped this would have quieted criticism, but it did not, and
for forty-odd years critics have been trying to fix the blame on
someone.
Of course, I cannot solve the problem, but I would suggest this: Gen.
Lee could not take the risk at Gettysburg that he took when he fought
his other battles. He was too far from his base of supplies. If he had
been defeated at Seven Pines, Manassas, Antietam, Fredericksburg,
Chancellorsville, the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, he would
have had the defences of Richmond to fall back upon. But not so at
Gettysburg. If he should be defeated there he must retain a
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