course, enters the
Chemung a mile and a quarter below. The river here sweeps around in a
graceful curve, making a full semi-circle, enclosing several hundred
acres of rich bottom lands, on which were the Indian cornfields; the
Wellsburg north and south road dividing it into two nearly equal
parts. Rising abruptly from this plain is a sharp, narrow ridge, known
locally as the Hog Back, this extends from the river across the plain
nearly to the creek, a distance of about a third of a mile. The crest
of this ridge was occupied by the enemy in force, protected by rude
log breast works and rifle pits, which extended to the eastern
extremity, and from thence turning north, connected with the steep
banks of the creek above. The lines to be defended were these two
sides of a triangle, their right resting on the river, their left on
the mountain, the path of the army passing between the two lines,
along which was also the enemy's line of retreat. From the angle in
the works a thin line extended to the mountain, on which was a body of
the enemy and also another small body on the mountain to the east. The
results at Chemung a few days previous, led the enemy to hope that a
like blunder might be repeated, and that Wyoming and Minnisinks were
to be re-enacted. Presuming that the army, after crossing the creek,
would follow the Indian trail without discovering their works, they
flattered themselves that an unexpected fire on the exposed flanks
would create great confusion, which if augmented by simultaneous
attacks in front and rear by the forces in that quarter, might result
in a panic, and a possible stampede of the pack horses and cattle,
which would be quite as disastrous as the defeat of the army. But
three companies of Morgan's riflemen, the pride of Washington, were in
the advance; these veterans of a hundred battles were in no way
inferior to the enemy in Indian craft; the works and position of the
enemy were discovered when afar off, and this ingenious device of
drawing our forces into an ambuscade was frustrated. The ambuscade
failing, the alternative was presented of forcing a direct attack in
front, under great disadvantage, or of a flanking movement, over very
difficult ground, where nearly the entire force of the enemy could be
brought to bear on the attacking force at any point on interior lines,
possibly in time to repulse one division of the army before the other
could come to its relief. The attack in front was invit