an testimony. Let me illustrate by a familiar
example what I understand by these two kinds of evidence, and what is to
be said respecting their value.

Suppose that a man tells you that he saw a person strike another and kill
him: that is testimonial evidence of the fact of murder. But it is
possible to have circumstantial evidence of the fact of murder: that is to
say, you may find a man dying with a wound upon his head having exactly
the form and character of the wound which is made by an axe; and, with due
care in taking surrounding circumstances into account, you may conclude
with the utmost certainty that the man has been murdered; that his death
is the consequence of a blow inflicted by another man with that implement.
We are very much in the habit of considering circumstantial evidence as of
less value than testimonial evidence; and it may be that, where the
circumstances are not perfectly clear and intelligible, it is a dangerous
and unsafe kind of evidence; but it must not be forgotten that, in many
cases, circumstantial is quite as conclusive as testimonial evidence, and
that, not unfrequently, it is a great deal weightier than testimonial
evidence. For example, take the case to which I referred just now. The
circumstantial evidence may be better and more convincing than the
testimonial evidence; for it may be impossible, under the conditions that
I have defined, to suppose that the man met his death from any cause but
the violent blow of an axe wielded by another man. The circumstantial
evidence in favor of a murder having been committed, in that case, is as
complete and as convincing as evidence can be. It is evidence which is
open to no doubt and to no falsification. But the testimony of a witness
is open to multitudinous doubts. He may have been mistaken. He may have
been actuated by malice. It has constantly happened that even an accurate
man has declared that a thing has happened in this, that, or the other
way, when a careful analysis of the circumstantial evidence has shown that
it did not happen in that way, but in some other way.

We may now consider the evidence in favor of or against the three
hypotheses. Let me first direct your attention to what is to be said about
the hypotheses of the eternity of the state of things in which we now
live. What will first strike you is, that it is a hypothesis which,
whether true or false, is not capable of verification by any evidence.
For, in order to obtain ei