advance its prosperity, or, in its
misfortunes, to retrieve its glory. By consequence every one in his
sphere, and using his faculties for this great end, will find his own
advantage in restraining the bad as dangerous, and opposing enemies to
the state as enemies to himself.

In a word, every man who will reflect for himself will be compelled to
acknowledge the necessity of virtue for the happiness of the world. It
is so obvious that justice is the basis of all society; that good will
and good offices necessarily procure for men affection and respect;
that every man who respects himself ought to seek the esteem of
others; that it is necessary to merit the good opinion of society;
that he ought to be jealous of his reputation; that a weak being, who
is every instant exposed to misfortunes, ought to know what are his
duties, and how he should practise them for the benefit of himself
and the assembly of which he is a member.

If we reflect for one moment on the effects of the passions, we shall
perceive the necessity of repressing them, if we would spare ourselves
vain regrets and useless sorrows, which certainly always afflict those
who obey not the laws. Thus, a single reflection will suffice to show
the impropriety of anger, the dreadful consequences of revenge,
calumny, and backbiting. Every one must perceive that in giving a free
course to unbridled desires, he becomes the enemy of society, and then
it is the part of the laws to restrain him who renounces his reason
and despises the motives that ought to guide him.

If it is objected that man is not a free agent, and therefore is
unable to restrain his passions, and that consequently the law ought
not to punish him, I reply that the community are impelled by the same
necessity to hate what is injurious, and for their own conservation
and happiness have the right to restrain an unhappily organized
individual who is impelled to injure himself and others. The
inevitable faults of men necessarily excite the hatred of those who
suffer from them.

If the man who consults his reason has real and powerful motives for
doing good to others and abstaining from injuring them, he has present
motives equally urgent to restrain him from the commission of vice.
Experience may suffice to show him that if he becomes sooner or later
the victim of his excesses, he ceases to be the friend of virtue, and
exists only to serve vice, which will infallibly punish him. This
being allowed