as idle, when his pleased attention was first caught with a
landscape of green shadows, when one evening at sunset he first
observed that the shadows of trees, which fell upon a white wall, were
green. He was first delighted with the exact representation of a green
arbour, which seemed as if it had been newly painted on the wall.
Certainly the boy with his rainbow on the floor was as much amused as
the philosopher with his coloured shadows; and, however high sounding
the name of Antonio de Dominis, bishop of Spalatro, it does not alter
the business in the least; he could have exerted only his _utmost
attention_ upon the theory of the rainbow, and the child did the same.
We do not mean to compare the powers of reasoning, or the abilities of
the child and the philosopher; we would only show that the same
species of attention was exerted by both.

To fix the attention of children, or, in other words, to interest
them about those subjects to which we wish them to apply, must be our
first object in the early cultivation of the understanding. This we
shall not find a difficult undertaking if we have no false
associations, no painful recollections to contend with. We can connect
any species of knowledge with those occupations which are immediately
agreeable to young people: for instance, if a child is building a
house, we may take that opportunity to teach him how bricks are made,
how the arches over doors and windows are made, the nature of the
keystone and butments of an arch, the manner in which all the
different parts of the roof of a house are put together, &c.; whilst
he is learning all this he is eagerly and seriously attentive, and we
educate his understanding in the best possible method. But if,
mistaking the application of the principle, that literature should be
made agreeable to children, we should entice a child to learn his
letters by a promise of a gilt coach, or by telling him that he would
be the cleverest boy in the world if he could but learn the letter
_A_, we use false and foolish motives; we may possibly, by such means,
effect the immediate purpose, but we shall assuredly have reason to
repent of such imprudent deceit. If the child reasons at all, he will
be content after his first lesson with being "the cleverest boy in the
world," and he will not, on a future occasion, hazard his fame, having
much to lose, and nothing to gain; besides, he is now master of a gilt
coach, and some new and larger reward mus