r this purpose as of equal value. This is the
radical individualism of the Benthamite creed, to be set against that
socialistic tendency which struck us in our preliminary account.

In this individualism, equality is fundamental. Everybody is to count
for one, nobody for more than one, for every one can feel pain and
pleasure. Liberty, on the other hand, is not fundamental, it is a means
to an end. Popular sovereignty is not fundamental, for all government is
a means to an end. Nevertheless, the school of Bentham, upon the whole,
stood by both liberty and democracy. Let us consider their attitude.

As to popular government, Bentham and James Mill reasoned after this
fashion. Men, if left to themselves, that is to say, if neither trained
by an educational discipline nor checked by responsibility, do not
consider the good of the greatest number. They consider their own good.
A king, if his power is unchecked, will rule in his own interest. A
class, if its power is unchecked, will rule in its own interest. The
only way to secure fair consideration for the happiness of all is to
allow to all an equal share of power. True, if there is a conflict the
majority will prevail, but they will be moved each by consideration of
his own happiness, and the majority as a whole, therefore, by the
happiness of the greater number. There is no inherent right in the
individual to take a part in government. There is a claim to be
considered in the distribution of the means of happiness, and to share
in the work of government as a means to this end. It would follow, among
other things, that if one man or one class could be shown to be so much
wiser and better than others that his or their rule would, in fact,
conduce more to the happiness of the greater number than a popular
system, then the business of government ought to be entrusted to that
man or that class and no one else ought to interfere with it.

The whole argument, however, implies a crude view of the problem of
government. It is, of course, theoretically possible that a question
should present itself, detached from other questions, in which a
definite measurable interest of each of the seven millions or more of
voters is at stake. For example, the great majority of English people
drink tea. Comparatively few drink wine. Should a particular sum be
raised by a duty on tea or on wine? Here the majority of tea-drinkers
have a measurable interest, the same in kind and roughly the same i