generous
power, and makes the man seem as if he were individually helping to
create the actuality of the truth whose metaphysical reality he is
willing to assume, will be sure to be responded to by large numbers.

The necessity of faith as an ingredient in our mental attitude is
strongly insisted on by the scientific philosophers of the present day;
but by a singularly arbitrary caprice they say that it is only
legitimate when used in the interests of one particular
proposition,--the proposition, namely, that the course of nature is
uniform. That nature will follow to-morrow the same laws that she
follows to-day is, they all admit, a truth which no man can _know_; but
in the interests of cognition as well as of action we must postulate or
assume it. As Helmholtz says: "Hier gilt nur der eine Rath: vertraue
und handle!" And Professor Bain urges: "Our only error is in proposing
to give any reason or justification of the postulate, or to treat it as
otherwise than begged at the very outset."

With regard to all other possible truths, however, a number of our most
influential contemporaries think that an attitude of faith is not only
illogical but shameful. Faith in a religious dogma for which there is
no outward proof, but which we are tempted to postulate for our
emotional interests, just as we {92} postulate the uniformity of nature
for our intellectual interests, is branded by Professor Huxley as "the
lowest depth of immorality." Citations of this kind from leaders of
the modern _Aufklaerung_ might be multiplied almost indefinitely. Take
Professor Clifford's article on the 'Ethics of Belief.' He calls it
'guilt' and 'sin' to believe even the truth without 'scientific
evidence.' But what is the use of being a genius, unless _with the
same scientific evidence_ as other men, one can reach more truth than
they? Why does Clifford fearlessly proclaim his belief in the
conscious-automaton theory, although the 'proofs' before him are the
same which make Mr. Lewes reject it? Why does he believe in primordial
units of 'mind-stuff' on evidence which would seem quite worthless to
Professor Bain? Simply because, like every human being of the
slightest mental originality, he is peculiarly sensitive to evidence
that bears in some one direction. It is utterly hopeless to try to
exorcise such sensitiveness by calling it the disturbing subjective
factor, and branding it as the root of all evil. 'Subjective' be it
called! a