e 23d connection was finally
ensured between the left of the Canadian Division and the French
right, about 800 yards east of the canal; but as this entailed the
maintenance by the British troops of a much longer line than that
which they had held before the attack commenced on the previous night,
there were no reserves available for counter-attack until
reinforcements, which were ordered up from the Second Army, were able
to deploy to the east of Ypres.

Early on the morning of the 23d I went to see General Foch, and from
him I received a detailed account of what had happened, as reported by
General Putz. General Foch informed me that it was his intention to
make good the original line and regain the trenches which the French
Division had lost. He expressed the desire that I should maintain my
present line, assuring me that the original position would be
re-established in a few days. General Foch further informed me that he
had ordered up large French reinforcements, which were now on their
way, and that troops from the North had already arrived to reinforce
General Putz.

I fully concurred in the wisdom of the General's wish to re-establish
our old line, and agreed to co-operate in the way he desired,
stipulating, however, that if the position was not re-established
within a limited time I could not allow the British troops to remain
in so exposed a situation as that which the action of the previous
twenty-four hours had compelled them to occupy.

During the whole of the 23d the enemy's artillery was very active, and
his attacks all along the front were supported by some heavy guns
which had been brought down from the coast in the neighborhood of
Ostend.

The loss of the guns on the night of the 22d prevented this fire from
being kept down, and much aggravated the situation. Our positions,
however, were well maintained by the vigorous counter-attacks made by
the 5th Corps.

During the day I directed two brigades of the 3d Corps, and the Lahore
Division of the Indian Corps, to be moved up to the Ypres area and
placed at the disposal of the Second Army.

In the course of these two or three days many circumstances combined
to render the situation east of the Ypres Canal very critical and most
difficult to deal with.

The confusion caused by the sudden retirement of the French Division,
and the necessity for closing up the gap and checking the enemy's
advance at all costs, led to a mixing up of units and a sudden