needs of war. It was, in truth,
astonishing to us--for we could not well comprehend how essentially
warlike were the instincts of this people, and how quick, therefore,
they must be in military matters--to observe the promptness that was
shown in getting our army in readiness for the field. And with our
astonishment came also a comforting conviction that the force that could
be so quickly, and, as it seemed, so effectively organized, must surely
hold well together, and fight well together, when the hour for fighting
came.
XXVII.
AN OFFER OF TERMS.
During the time that our various preparations thus went forward we had
no direct news from the stronghold of the enemy; yet many vague rumors
reached us of the army that was being set in order there to take the
field against us. On the other hand, the constant departure from among
us of those who were loyal to the ancient government kept the Priest
Captain well informed of all that was in progress in our camp. No effort
was made by the Council to prevent these departures, for all of our
plans were working so well, and our forces were increasing so
prodigiously, that it was to our advantage that the enemy should have
news of our rapidly augmenting strength; and especially was it hoped
that the news thus carried to the city might incline many there who
wavered in their allegiance to take open part with us--or, at the least,
to refuse to take part against us--and that in this way there might be
stirred up a very dangerous spirit of mutiny within the enemy's lines.
The plan of campaign that the Council had adopted struck me as being an
exceedingly prudent one. This was that we should not attempt an attack
upon the city--for, indeed, to assail such fortifications without
artillery would have been utterly hopeless--but should wait until the
enemy came out to assail us, and then meet him on our own chosen ground.
In every way this plan was in our favor. It most obviously was to our
advantage to delay as long as possible the battle that was inevitable,
and that, when it did come, must decide the fate of the rebellion
finally. Every day that this was deferred was a substantial gain to us,
in that the organization of our army was thereby rendered the more
complete, and also in that the effective hold of the new government upon
the people throughout the valley was thereby strengthened. On the side
of the enemy, delay would produce no corresponding gain, rather would it
t
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