till the incident was forgotten.[4]
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 3: Even Aristotle probably had some suspicion of it; so in his
anxiety to justify the institution of slavery he had to make out that
slaves were not men at all but only machines.]
[Footnote 4: Duelling might be classified theoretically as a survival of
the wolfish condition sketched in Sec. 5. But the persistent institution of
single combat should not be regarded as in itself a survival, but rather
as an outlet for the surviving instinct, a concession justified by
political or social considerations that vary from age to age. Even Plato
in his _Republic_ (465 A) agreed that the citizen might in certain
circumstances take the law into his own hands, probably regarding such
action as a sort of equity, what Aristotle calls [Greek: epanorthoma
nomou elleipei dia ton katholou], a rectification of certain special
cases not covered by law.
In modern states again, e.g. in Austria and Germany, duelling is not so
much a survival as a corollary of militarism, which involves a
fetichistic veneration of the military uniform or of military "honour."]
Sec. 8
The Nations of Europe _ferae naturae_
In the next and latest stage in the expansion of the moral system we
find it again conterminous with the frontiers of the State. But it is
now no longer the small city state of Ancient Greece and Mediaeval Italy,
but the large political unit, roughly and hypothetically national,[5]
which constitutes the modern State, whether Kingdom, Republic, or
Empire. I have called this the latest stage in the extension of the
sphere of morality because it is the one which actually prevails and
limits our national conduct. For the paradox of legal murder and
massacre in the modern world is resolved as soon as we realise that war
is a conflict between two or more isolated moral systems, each of which
only regards violence as a crime to be suppressed within the limits of
its own validity. International warfare in its crudest form is only a
manifestation of the original wolfish state of man, the "state of
nature" which exists between two moral agents who have no moral
obligation to each other (but only to themselves). The fact that the
primitive savage was an individual moral agent having no moral
obligation to anyone but himself, while the modern fighting nation is a
moral agent of who knows how many millions, does not alter the essential
character of the conflict.
FOOTNOTES:
[Fo
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