tle, might then be obtained by
negotiation at once, and at the cost of a certain amount of paper and
ink, instead of being forced on a revengeful and embittered opponent by
the expensive process of killing young men, a process which has the
disadvantage of working both ways.

The conclusion of these general considerations seems to be that all the
arguments that are likely to be put forward in the course of a war in
order to excuse and ensure its continuation, are only excuses to gain
time, put forward in hope that the chances of a further campaign may
enable the government concerned to retrieve some apparent advantage out
of the disastrous muddle through which they drifted into the first
declaration of war. Having drawn the sword in a moment of embarrassment,
they have now jolly well got to pretend that it was the right thing to
do, and are not going to sheathe it till they see a chance of proving
that they are glad they drew it. In short, there comes a point in all
modern wars in which the belligerents are fighting for nothing at all,
except for a more or less advantageous position from which to discuss a
way to stop fighting.[85]

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 83: Spinoza, _Ethica_, IV, _praefat. ad init._ Humanam
impotentiam in moderandis et coercendis affectibus servitutem voco.]

[Footnote 84: See above, Sec. 2, on "defensive" war, and compare a passage
from Mr. C. Grant Robertson's letter in _The Times_ of August 15,
1916:--

"Bismarck repeatedly and explicitly in the Reichstag justified the wars
of 1864, 1866, and 1870 as 'defensive'--i.e. as not 'willed' by Prussia.
On the contrary, they were wars 'forced' on a peace-loving State denied
its 'rights' by Denmark, Austria, and France. The argument, briefly, on
Bismarckian principles is this. Prussia's policy is an
'_Interessenpolitik_'--a policy of 'interests.' An 'interest' confers a
'right.' The satisfaction of 'national interest' is therefore the
achievement of 'national rights.' If these 'rights' can be achieved by a
compromise--i.e. by the complete surrender of Prussia's opponents to the
demands based on these 'rights'--that is a proof of her peace-loving
nature. But if her opponents refuse, then the war by which the 'rights'
are secured is a war 'forced' on Prussia. She has not 'willed' it. It is
a 'defensive' war to prevent the robbery of her 'rights' by others;
Bismarck, not without difficulty, converted his Sovereign to this
argument. In each case--1864, 186