hile, the initial French offensive which had been launched in
the region of the Vosges had resulted in the temporary capture of
Muelhouse, and had then been abandoned in order to face the threatening
disaster from the north.

It was thought advisable to wait until the concentration of the English
Army was completed, then, to comply with an obvious rule of strategy
which says, "Always close with your enemy when and wherever he shows
himself, in order to discover and hold him to his dispositions," a
general advance was made along the whole centre and left of the Allied
line. The line swung forward, and perhaps some day one of the handful
of men who know will tell exactly what was the object of this movement.
Was it meant to join battle in all seriousness with the enemy, and to
drive him from Belgium, or was it just a precautionary measure to hold
and delay him? Probably the latter. The Allied Generalissimo had
probably made up his mind to the fact that the first battle--the battle
in Belgium--was already lost by the Allies' lateness in concentration.
Regarded in this light the battle in Belgium was undoubtedly the
greatest rear-guard action in History.

On account of a possible under-estimation of the enemy's strength, and
of the completeness of his dispositions, the Allies found themselves,
when the lines first clashed, in a more serious position than they
probably anticipated. The enemy gained two initial successes that
decided, past doubt, the fate of the battle which was now raging along
the whole front from Mons to Muelhouse. Namur, the fortress which had
enjoyed a reputation as the Port Arthur of Europe, fell before the
weight of the German siege howitzer in a few days. The magnitude of the
disaster appalled the whole world, for indirectly the piercing of these
forts laid open the road to Paris. Nor was this all. The enemy forced
the passage of the Sambre at Charleroi, and threatened to cut the Allied
centre from the left. The British Army, on the extreme left, found
itself confronted by a numerical superiority of nearly three to one,
while its left flank and lines of communication with Havre were
seriously menaced by a huge body of Uhlan cavalry. In a word, the
positions taken up by the whole of the Allied centre and left were no
longer tenable. To hang on would have been to court disaster. There was
nothing for it but to cut and go.

But the Allies did not meet with the same ill luck along the whole line.
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