nce; but the development of the two is
contemporaneous, not successive. For each, there long exists an assured
province which is not invaded by the other; while, between the two, lies
a debateable land, ruled by a sort of bastards, who owe their complexion
to physicism and their substance to anthropomorphism, and are M. Comte's
particular aversions--metaphysical entities.
But, as the ages lengthen, the borders of Physicism increase. The
territories of the bastards are all annexed to science; and even
Theology, in her purer forms, has ceased to be anthropomorphic, however
she may talk. Anthropomorphism has taken stand in its last fortress--man
himself. But science closely invests the walls; and Philosophers gird
themselves for battle upon the last and greatest of all speculative
problems--Does human nature possess any free, volitional, or truly
anthropomorphic element, or is it only the cunningest of all Nature's
clocks? Some, among whom I count myself, think that the battle will for
ever remain a drawn one, and that, for all practical purposes, this
result is as good as anthropomorphism winning the day.
The classification of the sciences, which, in the eyes of M. Comte's
adherents, constitutes his second great claim to the dignity of a
scientific philosopher, appears to me to be open to just the same
objections as the law of the three states. It is inconsistent in itself,
and it is inconsistent with fact. Let us consider the main points of
this classification successively:--
"Il faut distinguer par rapport a tous les ordres des phenomenes,
deux genres de sciences naturelles; les unes abstraites,
generales, ont pour objet la decouverte des lois qui regissent les
diverses classes de phenomenes, en considerant tous les cas qu'on
peut concevoir; les autres concretes, particulieres, descriptives,
et qu'on designe quelquefois sous le nom des sciences naturelles
proprement dites, consistent dans l'application de ces lois a
l'histoire effective des differents etres existants."[23]
The "abstract" sciences are subsequently said to be mathematics,
astronomy, physics, chemistry, physiology, and social physics--the
titles of the two latter being subsequently changed to biology and
sociology. M. Comte exemplifies the distinction between his abstract and
his concrete sciences as follows:--
"On pourra d'abord l'apercevoir tres-nettement en comparant, d'une
part, la physiologie
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