auses enemies to rise against him, and him to
undertake against them: to the end he may have occasion to master them,
and know that ladder, which his enemies have set him upon, whereby to
rise yet higher. And therefore many think, that a wise Prince when he
hath the occasion, ought cunningly to nourish some enmity, that by the
suppressing thereof, his greatness may grow thereupon. Princes,
especially those that are new, have found more faith and profit in those
men, who in the beginning of their State, have been held suspected, than
in those who at their entrance have been their confidents. Pandulphus
Petrucci, Prince of Siena, governd his State, more with them that had
been suspected by him, than with the others. But of this matter we
cannot speak at large, because it varies according to the subject; I
will only say this, that those men, who in the beginning of a
Principality were once enemies, if they be of quality so that to
maintain themselves they have need of support, the Prince might alwaies
with the greatest facility gain for his; and they are the rather forced
to serve him faithfully, insomuch as they know it is more necessary for
them by their deeds to cancel that sinister opinion, which was once held
of them; and so the Prince ever draws from these more advantage, than
from those, who serving him too supinely, neglect his affairs. And seing
the matter requires it, I will not omit to put a Prince in mind, who
hath anew made himself master of a State, by means of the inward helps
he had from thence that he consider well the cause that mov'd them that
favor'd him to favor him, if it be not a natural affection towards him;
for if it be only because they were not content with their former
government, with much pains and difficulties shall he be able to keep
them long his friends, because it will be impossible for him to content
them. By these examples then which are drawn out of ancient and modern
affaires, searching into the cause hereof, we shall find it much more
easie to gain those men for friends, who formerly were contented with
the State, and therefore were his enemies: than those, who because they
were not contented therewith, became his fiends, and favor'd him in
getting the mastery of it. It hath been the custome of Princes, whereby
to hold their States more securely, to build Citadels, which might be
bridles and curbs to those that should purpose any thing against them,
and so to have a secure retreat fro