ases is not
so much a sight as a great bad smell. As for the rudiments of the
system which dictates the movements of troops in large masses or in
small, which sacrifices thousands of men to take a town or hold a river
when that town and that river, physically considered, appear to be of no
consequence whatsoever, those elements I have not been able to sense,
even though I studied the matter most diligently. So after sundry
months of first-hand observation in one of the theaters of hostilities,
I tell myself that the trade of fighting is a trade to be learned by
slow and laborious degrees, and even then may be learned with
thoroughness only by one who has a natural aptitude for it. Either
that, or else I am most extraordinarily thick-headed, for I own that I
am still as complete a greenhorn now as I was at the beginning.

Having made the confession which is said to be good for the soul, and
which in any event has the merit of blunting in advance the critical
judgments of the expert, since he must pity my ignorance and my
innocence even though he quarrel with my conclusions, I now assume the
role of prophet long enough to venture to say that the day of the modern
walled fort is over and done with. I do not presume to speak regarding
coast defenses maintained for the purposes of repelling attacks or
invasions from the sea. I am speaking with regard to land defenses
which are assailable by land forces. I believe in the future great
wars--if indeed there are to be any more great wars following after this
one--that the nations involved, instead of buttoning their frontiers
down with great fortresses and ringing their principal cities about with
circles of protecting works, will put their trust more and more in
transportable cannon of a caliber and a projecting force greater than
any yet built or planned. I make this assertion after viewing the
visible results of the operations of the German 42-centimeter guns in
Belgium and France, notably at Liege in the former country and at
Maubeuge in the latter.

Except for purposes of frightening non-combatants the Zeppelins
apparently have proved of most dubious value; nor, barring its value as
a scout--a field in which it is of marvelous efficiency--does the
aeroplane appear to have been of much consequence in inflicting loss
upon the enemy. Of the comparatively new devices for waging war, the
submarine and the great gun alone seem to have justified in any great
degree the h