f which he should not eat, upon pain of certain death. I should scarcely
wish so strong a prohibition against slavery in Nebraska.

But this argument strikes me as not a little remarkable in another
particular--in its strong resemblance to the old argument for the "divine
right of kings." By the latter, the king is to do just as he pleases with
his white subjects, being responsible to God alone. By the former,
the white man is to do just as he pleases with his black slaves, being
responsible to God alone. The two things are precisely alike, and it is
but natural that they should find similar arguments to sustain them.

I had argued that the application of the principle of self-government, as
contended for, would require the revival of the African slave trade; that
no argument could be made in favor of a man's right to take slaves to
Nebraska which could not be equally well made in favor of his right
to bring them from the coast of Africa. The Judge replied that the
Constitution requires the suppression of the foreign slave trade, but
does not require the prohibition of slavery in the Territories. That is a
mistake in point of fact. The Constitution does not require the action of
Congress in either case, and it does authorize it in both. And so there is
still no difference between the cases.

In regard to what I have said of the advantage the slave States have over
the free in the matter of representation, the Judge replied that we in
the free States count five free negroes as five white people, while in
the slave States they count five slaves as three whites only; and that the
advantage, at last, was on the side of the free States.

Now, in the slave States they count free negroes just as we do; and it so
happens that, besides their slaves, they have as many free negroes as we
have, and thirty thousand over. Thus, their free negroes more than balance
ours; and their advantage over us, in consequence of their slaves, still
remains as I stated it.

In reply to my argument that the compromise measures of 1850 were a system
of equivalents, and that the provisions of no one of them could fairly
be carried to other subjects without its corresponding equivalent being
carried with it, the Judge denied outright that these measures had any
connection with or dependence upon each other. This is mere desperation.
If they had no connection, why are they always spoken of in connection?
Why has he so spoken of them a thousand times