eign nation as any.
The casual Englishman visiting the United States for but a short time
will probably not discover this fact. He only knows that he is cordially
received himself--even more cordially, he feels, than he deserves--and
most probably those persons, especially the ladies, whom he meets will
assure him that they are "devoted" to England. He may not have time to
discover that that devotion is not universal. Only after a while, in all
probability, will the fact as stated by Mr. Freeman dawn upon him, and
he will somehow be aware that with all the charming hospitality that he
receives he is in some way treated as more of a foreigner than he is
conscious of being. It is necessary that he should have some extended
residence in the country--unless his visit happens to coincide with such
an incident as the Venezuelan controversy or the outbreak of the Boer
War--before things group themselves in at all their right perspective
before his eyes. The intensity of the feeling displayed at the time of
the Venezuelan incident came as a shock to Englishmen at home; but those
who had lived for any length of time in America (west of New York) were
not surprised. It is probable that the greater number of the American
people at that time wished for war, and believed that it was nothing but
cowardice on the part of Great Britain--her constitutional dislike of
fighting anybody of her own size, as a number of the papers pleasantly
phrased it--that prevented their wish from being gratified.
The concluding paragraphs of ex-President Cleveland's treatise on this
subject are illuminating. In 1895, as I have said, a majority of the
American people unquestionably wished to fight; but that numerical
majority included perhaps a minority of the native-born Americans, a
small minority certainly of the richer or more well-to-do among them,
and an almost infinitesimal proportion of the best educated of the
native-born. This is what Mr. Cleveland says:
"Those among us who most loudly reprehended and bewailed our vigorous
assertion of the Monroe Doctrine were the timid ones who feared personal
financial loss, or those engaged in speculation and stock-gambling, in
buying much beyond their ability to pay, and generally in living by
their wits [_sic_]. The patriotism of such people traverses exclusively
the pocket nerve. . . . But these things are as nothing when weighed
against the sublime patriotism and devotion to their nation's honour
exh
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