t undertakings, and
for social government, in any other than a bad light. But take the rule
of a father, which is the type of all good government, that under which
the divine jurisdiction has been graciously expressed to us. Consider
how a wise father will act as regards interference. His anxiety will not
be to drag his child along, undeviatingly, in the wake of his own
experience; but rather, to endue him with that knowledge of the chart and
compass, and that habitual observation of the stars, which will enable
the child, himself, to steer safely over the great waters. Such a father
will not be unreasonably solicitous to assimilate his son's character or
purposes to his own. He will not fall into the error of supposing that
experience is altogether a transferable commodity. The greatest good
which he designs for his son will, perhaps, be that which he can give him
indirectly, and which he may never speak to the youth about. He will
seek to surround him with good opportunities and favourable means: and
even when he interferes more directly, he will endeavour, in the first
instance, to lead rather than to compel, so that some room for choice may
still be left. Not thinking that his own power, his own dignity, his own
advantage are the chief objects for him to look to, his imagination will
often be with those whom he rules; and he will thus be able to look at
his own conduct with their eyes, not with his. This, alone, will keep
him from a multiplicity of errors. Now the same principles, actuated by
the same kind of love, should be at the bottom of all social government.
I believe that we shall be better able in practice to place wise limits
to interference by regulating and enlightening the animus which prompts
it, than by laying down rules for its action determined upon abstract
considerations. The attempt to fix such rules is not to be despised; but
if the persons, or society, about to interfere on any occasion, desired a
good object from right motives, I think they would have the best chance
of keeping themselves from using wrong means. In many cases, an unwise
interference takes place from a partial apprehension of the good to be
aimed at: enlarge and exalt the object; let it not be one-sided; and
probably the mode of attaining it will partake largely of the wisdom
shown in the choice of it. If, for instance, a government saw that it
had to encourage, not only judicious physical arrangements, but mental
and