power. The same standpoint was taken in the fundamental law of
the 4th November. This opinion was also expressed by the Constitutional
Committee without contradiction on two occasions, 1824 and 1839, when the
Storthing had even opposed a proposal concerning another matter. The
change, which Sec. 32 in the Constitution has since undergone, gives
increased support to the opinion that the Prime Minister's
Countersignature is intended for nothing else than a witness that the
King has made a Decree of certain import.

And that Sec. 31 is unconditional in its prescription of the duty of the
authorised countersignature of the Prime Minister is a conception that is
acceded to by those writers on State law who have framed the
Constitution. When the Cabinet quoted an opinion of the Norwegian
government in 1847 when the proposal for a new Act of Union was under
consideration, the Cabinet has overlooked, firstly, that this opinion, in
a manner that applies to Swedish government regulations Sec. 38, was
intended only to refer to orders issued but not the Decree of the King
included in the protocol, secondly that the Norwegian Government could
not prove that the Norwegian Constitution really provided any law
respecting the right to refuse countersignature. The Constitution on the
contrary emphatically prescribes in Sec. 30: "But to the King it is
reserved the right to form his decision according to His own judgment",
and in Sec. 31: "All Commands issued by the King himself (Military
Orders excepted) shall be countersigned by the Prime Minister (before
1873 the Norwegian Prime Minister).

That under these circumstances I feel Myself entitled to demand respect
for a Decree formed by the King of Norway in a Constitutional manner, is
a matter for which no one can blame me. The powers which the Constitution
grants the King, in order to further the good of the country to the best
of his convictions, are not greater than that they ought to be preserved
to the supreme power, so that no constitutional practices in conflict
with the principles of the fundamental law are introduced, which,
according to the explicit prescriptions in Sec. 112 may not be done, even
by an alteration of the fundamental law.

One of the chief principles of the Constitution--the most important of
all, in point of fact--is that Norway shall be a Constitutional
Monarchy. It is incompatible with this, that the King should sink to be a
helpless tool in the hands of His