nciples. For with Huxley we can say: "Even if the Darwinian
hypothesis were blown away, the doctrine of Evolution would remain
standing where it stood." In it we possess an acquisition of our
century which rests on facts, and which undoubtedly ranks amongst its
greatest."
This last sentence affirms exactly what I have repeatedly asserted: the
doctrine of Descent remains, Darwinism passes away. Hertwig then is
decidedly of opinion that Darwinism entirely fails in the individual
case because in its application the basis of experience vanishes.
Indeed, according to him, phylogeny is not at all capable of direct
scientific investigation. These are all important admissions which one
would certainly have considered impossible twenty years ago; they
unequivocally indicate the decline of Darwinian views, and in a certain
way also harmonize with Fleischmann's work.
True, Hertwig still clings to the thought of Descent, but apparently no
longer as to a conclusion of natural science. This appears from the
assertion: "Ontogeny alone is capable of a direct scientific (he
evidently speaks of natural science) investigation," and from the other
statement that a _philosophically_ trained investigator will accept it
(Descent) as axiomatic although it belongs to the domain of hypothesis.
What else does this mean but that: We have no specific knowledge of
Descent but we believe in it. In short, this is not natural science but
natural philosophy; it forms no constituent part of our certain
knowledge of nature but it is one aspect of our world-view.
All the above-quoted assertions of Hertwig are calm and well-considered
and show a decided deviation from the Darwinian position. Above all we
are pleased to note that he appropriates Spencer's phrase regarding the
"Impotence of Natural Selection" and that in the citation from Huxley
he at least admits the possibility that the Darwinian doctrine will be
"wafted away."
It is also proper to mention here the fact that in another place
Hertwig no longer recognizes so fully the dogma set up by Fritz Mueller
and Haeckel which is so closely bound up with Darwinism. I mean the
so-called "biogenetic principle" according to which the individual
organism is supposed to repeat in its development the development of
the race during the course of ages.
In his book: "The Cell and the Tissue" (Die Zelle und die Gewebe, II.
Jena 1898, p. 273) Hertwig says: "We must drop the expression:
'repetition of for
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