Smith
to the grand vizier, to propose to him a suspension of arms, had not
reached him in time to prevent the melancholy catastrophe at El Arish.
Sir Sidney Smith was a man of generous feelings: this barbarous massacre
of a French garrison horrified him, and, above all, it made him
fearful of the rupture of the negotiations. He lost no time in sending
explanations to Kleber, both in his own name and that of the grand
vizier, and he added the formal assurance that all hostility should
cease during the negotiations.

Kleber, when informed of the massacre of El Arish, did not manifest as
much indignation as he ought to have done; he was aware that, if he was
too warm upon that subject, all the negotiations might be broken off.
He was more urgent than ever for a suspension of arms; and, at the
same time, by way of precaution, and to be nearer to the theatre of
the conferences, he left Cairo, and transferred his headquarters to
Salahieh, on the very border of the desert, two days' march from El
Arish.

In the meantime, Desaix and Poussielgue, detained by contrary winds,
had not been able to land at Gaza till the 11th, and to reach El Arish
before the 13th.

The evacuation and its conditions soon became the sole subject of
negotiation. After long discussions it was agreed that all hostility
should cease for three months; that those three months should be
employed by the vizier in collecting, in the ports of Rosetta, Abukir,
and Alexandria, the vessels requisite for the conveyance of the French
army; by General Kleber, in evacuating the Upper Nile, Cairo, and the
contiguous provinces, and in concentrating his troops about the point of
embarkation; that the French should depart with the honours of war;
that they should cease to impose contributions; but that, in return,
the French army should receive three thousand purses, equivalent at that
time to three million francs, and representing the sum necessary for its
subsistence during the evacuation and the passage. The forts of Katieh,
Salahieh, and the Belbeys, forming the frontier of Egypt towards the
desert of Syria, were to be given up ten days after the ratification;
Cairo forty days after.

The terms of the convention being arranged, there was nothing more to
be done but sign it. Kleber, who had a vague feeling of his fault,
determined, in order to cover it, to assemble a council of war, to which
all the generals of the army were summoned. The council met on the 21st