it proposes, the rupee to 1s. 6d., L168,000 a year would be the price
that the measure would entail on a portion of the inhabitants of the
native state of Mysore on this single article of export. But this direct
cash loss is far from being all; and if the reader will turn back to the
Introductory Chapter, and to that on Coffee Planting in Coorg, he will
there find an explanation of the extraordinary effect produced by the
introduction of capital into the rural districts of India, and of the
remarkable effects it produces on the prosperity of the people, the
development of the agricultural resources of the country, and the finances
of the Government. But, for the convenience of the reader, I may briefly
repeat here what I have pointed out in greater detail in the chapters
alluded to.

From the estimate given of the profits of well-managed European
plantations which have been formed on the best land (_vide_ chapters on
Coffee Planting in Coorg, and in Mysore), it is evident that, though these
would be greatly injured by the exchange being forced up, they could still
make fair profits; and, indeed, it is conceivable that, from the losses
that the Government measure would entail, they might ultimately be in as
good a position as they are now; for there are large amounts of poor lands
which, if the Government policy is pursued, would be thrown out of
cultivation, either partially or entirely, and the diminished production
and demand for labour would, of course, be of great advantage to the
estates which survived. And what would largely accelerate the decrease of
cultivation would be the fact that if the exchange is forced up all
confidence in the Government will naturally be shaken. For how can
producers have any confidence in a Government which, instead of levying on
the country as a whole the increased taxes it requires, seeks to attain
its financial ends by manipulating the currency in such a way as to reduce
to the producers the prices of the commodities they grow for export? And
if the gold value of silver is to be forced up to 1s. 4d., and with the
declared possibility of its being forced up to 1s. 6d., what is more
likely than that the Government may persevere with this disastrous policy
whenever it again finds itself in financial straits? And is it not evident
that the present financial policy of the Government, and the possibility
of its being further pursued, must give that shock to confidence which
will at once re