ich is imperatively fixed and ordained by Act of Parliament, and any
other sentence would be illegal.

There are certain principles which I consider ought never to be lost
sight of.

In the first place, it must be remembered that for mere immorality,
not made criminal by the common or statute law of the land, no
punishment can be legally inflicted, and, in my opinion, no crime
ought to be visited with a heavier punishment merely because it is
also against the laws of God.

Take, for example, the crime of unlawfully knowing a girl under
the age of sixteen years, even with consent. Assume that with her
invitation the man committed himself. Go further, and establish the
sin of incest. The latter sin ought to be _totally ignored_ in dealing
with the _statutory_ offence.

I must not, however, be understood as intending my observations to
apply to cases where the immorality is in itself an _element_ of the
crime. My view is that the rule ought to apply only in cases where
the immorality is only a sin against God, and is severable from the
_crime_ committed against the laws of the land.

The case I have suggested is an illustration of what I mean.

Secondly, a sentence ought never to be so severe as to create in the
mind of reasonable persons, having knowledge of the circumstances, a
sympathy with the criminal, for that tends to bring the administration
of the law into discredit, and while giving a Judge credit for having
acted with the strictest sense of justice, it might give rise to a
suspicion of his fitness and qualifications for the administration of
the criminal law--a state of things which ought to be avoided.

The same observations apply, but not with equal force, to sentences
which may to reasonable persons acquainted with all the circumstances
appear to be ridiculously light, for it is more consistent with our
laws to err on the side of mercy than on the side of severity.

The object of criminal sentences is to compel the observance by all
persons, high and low, rich and poor, of those public rights and
privileges, both as regards the persons and property common to all
their fellow-subjects, the infringement of which is made criminal.

For the infringement of other rights of a private character the law
has provided civil remedies with which we are not at this moment
concerned.

Punishments, then, should be administered only as a necessary sequence
to the breach of a _criminal_ law, with the object of det