have taken. But my later
experience has taught me two lessons: first, that things are seen
plainer after the events have occurred; second, that the most confident
critics are generally those who know the least about the matter
criticised. I know just enough about the Mexican war to approve
heartily of most of the generalship, but to differ with a little of it.
It is natural that an important city like Puebla should not have been
passed with contempt; it may be natural that the direct road to it
should have been taken; but it could have been passed, its evacuation
insured and possession acquired without danger of encountering the enemy
in intricate mountain defiles. In this same way the City of Mexico
could have been approached without any danger of opposition, except in
the open field.

But General Scott's successes are an answer to all criticism. He invaded
a populous country, penetrating two hundred and sixty miles into the
interior, with a force at no time equal to one-half of that opposed to
him; he was without a base; the enemy was always intrenched, always on
the defensive; yet he won every battle, he captured the capital, and
conquered the government. Credit is due to the troops engaged, it is
true, but the plans and the strategy were the general's.

I had now made marches and been in battle under both General Scott and
General Taylor. The former divided his force of 10,500 men into four
columns, starting a day apart, in moving from Puebla to the capital of
the nation, when it was known that an army more than twice as large as
his own stood ready to resist his coming. The road was broad and the
country open except in crossing the Rio Frio mountain. General Taylor
pursued the same course in marching toward an enemy. He moved even in
smaller bodies. I never thought at the time to doubt the infallibility
of these two generals in all matters pertaining to their profession. I
supposed they moved in small bodies because more men could not be passed
over a single road on the same day with their artillery and necessary
trains. Later I found the fallacy of this belief. The rebellion, which
followed as a sequence to the Mexican war, never could have been
suppressed if larger bodies of men could not have been moved at the same
time than was the custom under Scott and Taylor.

The victories in Mexico were, in every instance, over vastly superior
numbers. There were two reasons for this. Both General Scott a